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GUCCI V. ALIBABA: A BALANCED APPROACH TO SECONDARY 
LIABILITY FOR E-COMMERCE PLATFORMS 
Esther A. Zuccaro* 
This Recent Development discusses the future of secondary 
liability for e-commerce platforms whose users sell counterfeit 
goods in the wake of the ongoing Gucci v. Alibaba litigation. 
Should the plaintiffs prevail, e-commerce platforms will be held 
accountable to cooperate with brand owners by removing 
infringing listings in a timely fashion and sanctioning users who 
sell counterfeits in an effective manner, resulting in a more brand-
protective environment than that under the current Tiffany v. eBay 
standard. Such a result will compel e-commerce platforms to share 
the burden of policing counterfeiters with trademark owners, 
working together to combat trademark infringement. Not only will 
this be a more effective means of discouraging appropriation, but 
it will also reinforce public policy goals and ultimately benefit 
trademark owners, e-commerce platforms, and consumers.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
What qualifies an item as “luxury”? The concept of luxury 
“can be as subjective and elusive as it is obvious.”1 High price, 
non-essential nature, indulgence, provenance, craftsmanship, 
exclusivity, and experience can all be indicators of luxury.2 This 
allure attracts consumers to pay top dollar for extravagant and 
often unnecessary items.3 Indeed, reputation is a critical component 
of luxury; one that is not easily created.4 
                                                
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2016. 
 1 Tom Teicholz, Cult of Luxury: Who Makes High-End Goods and How We 
Recognize It, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
tomteicholz/2015/02/05/cult-of-luxury-what-it-is-who-makes-it-and-how-we-
recognize-it/. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Tom Teicholz, Cult of Luxury: Craftsmanship, Scarcity, and the Hermès 
Brand, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
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Trademarks are powerful tools for luxury brands, as they 
denote the “status, quality, and price of the brand’s goods.”5 
Accordingly, trademarks convey a notion of the brand’s reputation, 
undoubtedly a product of the goodwill and quality of the brand’s 
goods or services.6 To protect such reputation, luxury brands spend 
hundreds of millions of dollars to combat counterfeiting.7 At first 
glance, counterfeits or knockoffs may resemble luxury goods; 
however they are often made of poor quality materials, lacking the 
attention to detail and high standard of craftsmanship for which 
luxury brands are known.8 Counterfeiting threatens a brand’s very 
livelihood in that consumers may confuse knockoff products with 
the genuine articles and conclude that the brand’s luxury items are 
of inferior quality and not worth the high price.9 
The scope of global counterfeiting efforts is vast and often 
considered the “single greatest threat to brand owners.”10 In 2014, 
the U.S. Border Patrol confiscated knockoff goods at the border 
that would have been valued at $1.2 billion dollars, had they been 
genuine pieces.11 Throughout the world, it is estimated that $1.8 
                                                                                                         
tomteicholz/2015/03/12/cult-of-luxury-craftmanship-scarcity-and-the-hermes-
brand/. 
 4 Tom Teicholz, Cult of Luxury: Dolce, Gabbana And The Importance Of A 
Good Reputation, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2015, 2:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/tomteicholz/2015/03/20/cult-of-luxury-dolce-gabbana-and-the-importance-
of-a-good-reputation/. 
 5 See Kurt M. Saunders & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, The Liability of Online 
Markets for Counterfeit Goods: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary 
Trademark Infringement in the United States and Europe, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 37, 38 (2011). 
 6 See id. 
 7 French Conglomerate LVMH Has Built its Name on Luxury, THE FASHION 
LAW (September 1, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/french-
conglomerate-lvmh-has-built-its-name-on-luxury. 
 8 Saunders & Berger-Walliser, supra note 5, at 38. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See First Amended Complaint at 42, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. 
Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 11  Counterfeit.com, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21660111-makers-expensive-bags-
clothes-and-watches-are-fighting-fakery-courts-battle. 
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trillion dollars in knockoffs are sold every year.12 Counterfeited 
items include watches, jewelry, handbags, wallets, clothing, 
pharmaceuticals, personal care items, footwear, and consumer 
electronics.13 With the advance of new technology, counterfeiting 
has become an even larger, more complex threat to brands. In 
recent years, with the rise of e-commerce platforms and online 
stores, the Internet has redefined the shopping experience. What 
was once an activity requiring customers to dress in their finery 
and travel downtown has now been reduced to a few clicks of a 
mouse. The sheer breadth of items available for purchase online 
has grown exponentially as well.14 Online auction websites such as 
eBay allow anyone to relatively anonymously sell items on such 
platforms.15 With the creation of e-commerce platforms and online 
boutiques, online shoppers can buy anything from a two dollar 
toothbrush to a two thousand dollar handbag. However, such 
convenience comes at a price: instances of trademark infringement 
and counterfeiting have become more prevalent with the popularity 
of e-commerce websites.16 Online shopping permits consumers to 
buy and sell counterfeits from the comfort of their living rooms, 
eliminating “dark alleys and basements from the buying 
equation.”17 E-commerce marketplaces can provide a successful 
setting for counterfeiters: low operating costs to sell on websites, 
                                                
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14  What is Taobao?, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/video/what-is-taobao/69BD4B54-0417-4075-A54D-5FC89 
5B5B3F3.html; Paul Grey, How Many (More) Products Does Amazon Sell?, 
EXPORT X (August 14, 2014), http://export-x.com/2014/08/14/many-products-
amazon-sell-2/. For instance, over 800 million products are available on 
Alibaba’s Chinese e-commerce platform Taobao at any time. It is estimated that 
Amazon sells over 250 million products in America alone. Id. 
 15 EBAY, What We Do, https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/who-we-are/ 
(last visited October 29, 2015) (“Whether you are buying new or used, plain or 
luxurious, commonplace or rare, trendy or one-of-a-kind – if it exists in the 
world, it probably is for sale on eBay.”). 
 16 See Saunders & Berger-Walliser, supra note 5, at 38. 
 17 Maura Kutner, The Fight Against Fakes Online, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Dec. 
14, 2010), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/trends/a622/fight-against-
fakes-online-0111/. 
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less risk of legal action, and the ability to easily open another store, 
should one be shut down.18 
Accordingly, e-commerce platforms and Internet operators 
have been sued by luxury brands over counterfeits sold by users, 
both in the United States and in Europe.19 Trademark owners have 
asserted that online marketplaces should be held liable for their 
users’ illegal activity because they allow the sale of counterfeits 
through their websites.20 Courts have determined the outcome of 
such cases based on the requisite level of knowledge e-commerce 
platforms possess of their users’ illicit acts.21 The current landscape 
of contributory liability law in the United States under the Tiffany 
standard22 protects the e-commerce platform, not the trademark 
owner, to the detriment of public policy concerns.23 However, an 
ongoing lawsuit, Gucci v. Alibaba,24 carries the potential to shift 
the standard to one, which, should the plaintiffs prevail, is more 
                                                
 18 Second Amended Complaint at 47, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding 
Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 19 See Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d. Cir. 2010); Louis Vuitton 
Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); L’Oreal SA 
v. eBay Int’l AG [2009] EWHC 1094 (Eng.). 
 20  See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106 (“Tiffany urged that eBay be held 
contributorially liable on the basis that despite that knowledge, it continued to 
make its services available to infringing sellers.”) 
 21 See id. at 107. (“[T]he district court concluded that for Tiffany to establish 
eBay’s contributory liability, Tiffany would have to show that eBay ‘knew or 
had reason to know of specific instances of actual infringement’ beyond those 
that it addressed upon learning of them.”) 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 109 (internal citations omitted). The court held: 
Tiffany and its amici express their concern that if eBay is not held 
liable except when specific counterfeit listings are brought to its 
attention, eBay will have no incentive to root out such listings from its 
website. They argue that this will effectively require Tiffany and 
similarly situated retailers to police eBay’s website – and many others 
like it ‘24 hours a day, and 365 days a year.’ They urge that this is a 
burden that most mark holders cannot afford to bear. 
Id. 
 24 Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
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brand protective.25 A verdict for the plaintiffs would safeguard 
brands against counterfeiters imposing upon the brands’ good will 
and esteemed reputation, and restore confidence in consumers that 
what they purchase online is legitimate. 
This Recent Development will proceed in five parts: Part II 
will introduce the Alibaba marketplace’s history of counterfeiting 
issues and the Gucci complaint; Part III will provide an overview 
of secondary liability for trademark infringement in the United 
States under the Tiffany standard; Part IV will apply the Tiffany 
standard to the Gucci complaint and argue why the Plaintiff’s 
secondary liability argument should prevail; and Part V will 
conclude. 
II. INTRODUCING ALIBABA’S HISTORY OF COUNTERFEITING 
ISSUES AND THE GUCCI COMPLAINT 
A. The Alibaba Group 
Founded sixteen years ago, Alibaba is China’s largest e-
commerce company, utilized in eighty percent of online Chinese 
commerce.26 Alibaba is a network of interconnected products and 
services, 27  constituting an all-in-one e-commerce marketplace, 
                                                
25 Currently, in the interest of pursuing mediation, the Plaintiffs have entered a 
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice against four of the eleven 
Alibaba Defendants: Alibaba.com Investment Holding Limited; Alibaba.com 
Investment Limited; Alibaba.com, Inc.; and Taobao Holding, Ltd. The Plaintiffs 
are not pursuing mediation with respect to the thirty-one merchant defendants. 
In the event that mediation fails, this prospectus will still be valid. See 
Stipulation and Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Against 
Certain Defendants, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-
03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  
 26 Sarah Gray, Why a company you’ve never heard of is about to take over the 
world, SALON (Sept. 18, 2014 11:05 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/09/18/ 
why_a_company_youve_never_heard_of_is_about_to_take_over_the_world/. 
For an introduction to the Alibaba Group, see Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd. 
Registration Statement (Form F-1) 1-6 (May 6, 2014) [hereinafter Registration 
Statement]. 
27  What is Alibaba?, WALL STREET JOURNAL, http://projects.wsj.com/ 
alibaba/?mod=e2tw. 	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bank, and search engine.28 Alibaba offers services on its platforms 
conceptualized as a mix of eBay’s user-generated listings29 and 
Amazon’s wide product availability,30 with additional features such 
as product search functions and online payment systems, similar to 
those of Google31 and PayPal.32 The Alibaba company offers three 
main e-commerce websites: Taobao, Tmall, and Alibaba.com.33 
Taobao is Alibaba’s largest business, on which vendors may list 
items free of charge, but pay for services such as advertising so 
that their products stand out.34 Similar to Google, Alibaba makes 
money by selling advertising and search placement to Taobao 
vendors.35 Tmall is a more upscale e-commerce website on which 
large brands such as Nike or Proctor and Gamble pay a hefty fee to 
list their products.36 Alibaba also obtains commission from the 
                                                
28 Id. 
29 eBay is an online auction website that provides a platform for users to buy 
and sell goods. EBAY, What is Ebay?, http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/ 
account/questions/about-ebay.html (last visited November 19, 2015). See also 
eBay, supra note 15. 
30  Amazon is an e-commerce platform where customers “can find and 
discover virtually anything they want to buy online,” offering “low prices, vast 
selection, and convenience.” AMAZON, Overview, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/ 
phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-mediaKit (last visited November 19, 2015).  
31 Google offers various technologies such as a search engine, email service, 
Internet browser, advertising programs, and cloud computing tools. See 
GOOGLE, Our products and services, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/ 
company/products/ (last visited November 19, 2015).  
32 “Paypal is a service that enables you to pay, send money, and accept 
payments without revealing your financial details.” PAYPAL, Checkout with 
PayPal – Faster. Safer. Easier., https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/paypal-
popup (last visited November 19, 2015). See also Gray, supra note 26. 
 33 Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. “The Alibaba Defendants have created 
an online global marketplace on their websites Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com 
and Taobao.com (collectively, the ‘Alibaba Marketplaces’) for the sale of 
wholesale and retail products originating from China.” Second Amended 
Complaint at 3, Gucci Am. V. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 34 Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. 
 35 Alibaba is not the Amazon of China, CNN MONEY (HONG KONG) (Sept. 16, 
2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/15/investing/alibaba-amazon-china/ 
index.html?iid=EL. 
 36 Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. 
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retail brands who sell their goods on Tmall. 37  Alibaba.com 
connects Chinese companies with exporters throughout the world.38 
Alibaba’s latest venture involved offering over $3.5 billion dollars 
for ownership of Youku Tudou, the Chinese equivilant of Youtube, 
investing in China’s rapidly growing digital media market.39 
Alibaba is arguably the world’s largest e-commerce company, 
as it hosts millions of merchants and businesses and boasts 
hundreds of millions of users throughout its three principal 
websites: Taobao, Tmall, and Alibaba.com.40 According to lead 
founder and executive chairman Jack Ma,41 the company also 
employs a so-called Internet “ecosystem,” which permits 
consumers to shift between Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms and 
mobile apps.42 These apps allow users to perform a myriad of 
activities beyond the realm of online shopping, from hailing a taxi 
to investing in a money market fund.43 
Although the average American consumer has likely never 
heard of the company,44 Alibaba handles more business than any 
other e-commerce company in the world.45 Alibaba is not only 
home of the largest online clothing marketplace,46 it is the most 
frequented e-commerce destination in the world. 47  In 2013, it 
                                                
 37 CNN Money, supra note 35. 
 38 Chris Wright, So What Exactly Is Alibaba?, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/09/16/so-what-exactly-is-alibaba/. 
 39  Alibaba offers $3.6 billion to buy China’s ‘Youtube’, CNN MONEY 
(LONDON) (Oct. 16, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/16/technology/ 
alibaba-youku-tudou-video/index.html. 
 40 Wright, supra note 38. 
41 ALIBABA GROUP, Leadership, http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/about/leadership 
(last visited November 19, 2015).  
 42 CNN Money, supra note 35. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See Gray, supra note 26. 
 45 Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. 
 46 Gregory Babcock, Alibaba Is the Biggest Online Clothing Marketplace in 
the World, and Is Full of Fake Yeezys, Givency, and Everything Else, COMPLEX 
(Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.complex.com/style/2014/09/a-sample-of-fake-
products-on-alibaba/. 
 47 Wall Street Journal, supra note 27; See Paul Mozur and Juro Osawa, 
Alibaba 11.11 Shopping Festival Breaks Record, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 
11, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230464410457 
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boasted $248 billion dollars in total transactions, a figure greater 
than eBay and Amazon’s sales combined.48 In 2015, Alibaba.com 
alone boasted 350 million active buyers and more than $12 billion 
dollars in earnings.49 On the Chinese equivalent of Black Friday in 
2013, Alibaba’s sales totaled $5.75 billion dollars, a figure three 
times larger than that Americans spent on all United States online 
shopping websites during both Thanksgiving and Black Friday.50 
Such large sales are attributable in part to the sheer volume of 
Chinese Internet users and the popularity of online shopping in 
China.51 There are an estimated 500 million Internet users in China, 
compared to the United States population of about 330 million 
people.52 Moreover, unlike in the United States, many large cities 
in China do not offer shopping malls or large retail centers, 
resulting in Chinese residents turning to shopping online for their 
retail needs.53 Alibaba’s business thrives on the lack of brick and 
mortar stores in China, a hallmark of American shopping.54 Jack 
Ma explained, “E-Commerce in the U.S. is like a dessert... It’s just 
supplementary to your own business. In China, because the 
infrastructure of commerce is [so] bad, e-commerce becomes the 
main course.”55 
                                                                                                         
9191590951567808. China is considered the world’s fastest growing e-
commerce market; it is estimated that China’s e-commerce market will reach 
$713 billion by the year 2017.  
 48 Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. 
 49 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 47–48. 
 50  See Nicholas Carlson, A Single Chinese Company Dwarfed All Of 
America’s Black Friday And Thanksgiving Online Sales In One Day, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/alibaba-dwarfs-
americas-black-friday-2013-12#!KcRrH. Singles Day is the Chinese equivalent 
of Black Friday, celebrated every year on November 11, in celebration of single 
individuals. Alibaba specifically chose 11/11 as Singles Day because the date is 
entirely comprised of ones. 
 51 See Carlson, supra note 50. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Registration Statement, supra note 26, at Table of Contents. As of 2013, 
China’s retail space per capita totaled 0.6 square meters, compared with 2.6 
square meters in the United States, 1.3 square meters in the United Kingdom, 
1.3 square meters in Japan, and 1.5 square meters in Germany. 
 55 CNN Money, supra note 35. 
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However Alibaba is not merely the Chinese equivalent of 
American e-commerce platforms such as eBay or Amazon.56 More 
precisely, it is a combination of Amazon, eBay, and Google, 
offering platforms in “e-commerce, logistics, cloud computing, 
digital marketing[,] and mobile Internet services.” 57  Ma even 
rejects the notion that it is an e-commerce company,58 insisting that 
Alibaba assists others to execute e-commerce, and does not sell 
goods.59 Essentially, Ma emphasized that Alibaba works to connect 
buyers and sellers, but Alibaba itself is not a seller.60 
Alibaba boasted the largest initial public offering (“IPO”) to 
date, with a closing value of $25 billion dollars and company value 
of $231 billion dollars.61 According to its IPO filing, Alibaba’s 
international strategy focuses on connecting Chinese merchants 
and manufacturers with worldwide businesses and consumers.62 In 
creating Alibaba, Ma, a former English teacher, aimed from the 
very start to compete against Silicon Valley instead of other 
Chinese companies, and has been compared to the Steve Jobs or 
Bill Gates of China. 63  After Alibaba’s IPO, Ma became the 
                                                
 56 See id. 
 57 China’s Alibaba files for landmark IPO, CNN MONEY (NEW YORK) (MAY 
7, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/06/investing/alibaba-ipo/index.html; 
ALIBABA GROUP, Dear Fellow Shareholder, http://ar.alibabagroup.com/2015/ 
letter2.html (last visited November 19, 2015).  
 58 Interestingly, in its F-1 SEC Filing, Alibaba introduces its company and 
websites by purporting, “Alibaba is synonymous with e-commerce in China.” 
Registration Statement, supra note 26, at Table of Contents. 
 59 CNN Money, supra note 35. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Telis Demos & Juro Osawa, Alibaba Debut Makes a Splash, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Updated Sept. 19, 2014, 8:28PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
alibaba-shares-trade-higher-in-ipo-1411142120. 
 62 Lulu Yilun Chen, Alibaba Taps Chinese Diaspora as Global Amazon 
Battle, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2014-09-11/alibaba-taps-chinese-diaspora-as-global-amazon-battle. Jack Ma 
chose the name ‘Alibaba’ because it could be readily pronounced in nearly any 
language, indicative of his global aspirations. See Kevin Chan, Alibaba’s IPO 
Caps a Success Tale for Jack Ma, INC (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.inc.com/ 
associated-press/alibaba-founder-success-tale.html. 
 63 E.g., Kelvin Chan, Alibaba’s IPO Caps a Success Tale for Jack Ma, INC 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.inc.com/associated-press/alibaba-founder-success-
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wealthiest man in China, possessing a net worth of $25 billion 
dollars.64 
Alibaba, which has been called “the Internet’s Mecca for 
Counterfeit Clothing,”65 has a history of counterfeiting and knock-
off items for sale. 66  The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (“USTR”) 67  compiles a Notorious Markets List 
every year, identifying certain marketplaces, both on and offline, 
“that reportedly engage in and facilitate substantial copyright 
piracy and trademark counterfeiting.”68 Alibaba’s websites are no 
stranger to the notorious market lists. Alibaba.com was listed in 
2008, 2009, and 2010, and Taobao was listed in 2008, 2009, 2010, 
and 2011, but were subsequently removed.69 In previous years, the 
USTR deemed Taobao, an Alibaba-owned website, a “notorious 
marketplace” offering “widespread availability of counterfeit and 
pirated goods.”70 In 2012, the USTR removed Taobao from the list 
due to its attempts to address counterfeiting and trademark 
                                                                                                         
tale.html; Mark Hanrahan, What Is Alibaba? China’s E-Commerce Giant 
Explained, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/what-alibaba-chinas-e-commerce-giant-explained-1690 
996. 
 64 Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. 
 65 Cameron Wolf, Alibaba, The Internet’s Mecca for Counterfeit Clothing, Is 
Being Sued by a Group of High-Fashion Brands, COMPLEX (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.complex.com/style/2015/05/alibaba-being-sued-by-kering-group-again. 
 66 Babcock, supra note 46. 
 67 The Office of the United States Trade Representative is an executive 
agency “responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. international trade, 
commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing negotiations with 
other countries.” Mission of the USTR, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/about-ustr (last visited October 30, 
2015). 
 68 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 Out-of-Cycle Review of 
Notorious Markets 2 (2015), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ 
2014%20Notorious%20Markets%20List%20-%20Published_0.pdf (last visited 
October 30, 2015). 
 69 Registration Statement, supra note 26, at 30–31. 
 70 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 68, at 8; see also 
Sophia Yan, Alibaba has a major counterfeit problem, CNN MONEY (Hong 
Kong) (September 12, 2014, 7:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/11/ 
technology/alibaba-counterfeit-ipo/index.html?iid=EL. 
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infringement claims from both brand owners and consumers.71 
Alibaba acknowledged these and other counterfeiting issues, 
identifying them as potential risks for investors in its Registration 
Statement to the Securities and Exchange Commission: 
Although we have adopted measures to verify the authenticity of 
products sold on our marketplaces and minimize potential infringement 
of third-party intellectual property rights through our intellectual 
property infringement complaint and take-down procedures, these 
measures may not always be successful. We may be subject to 
allegations of civil or criminal liability for unlawful activities carried 
out by third parties through our online marketplaces. When we receive 
complaints or allegations regarding infringement or counterfeit goods, 
we follow certain procedures to verify the nature of the complaint and 
the relevant facts. We believe these procedures are important to ensure 
confidence in our marketplace among buyers and sellers; however, 
these procedures could result in delays in delistings of allegedly 
infringing product listings. In the event that alleged counterfeit or 
infringing products are listed or sold on our marketplaces or our other 
services, we could face claims for such listings, sales, or alleged 
infringement or for our failure to act in a timely or effective manner to 
restrict or limit such sales or infringement. We may implement further 
measures in an effort to protect against these potential liabilities that 
could require us to spend substantial additional resources and/or 
experience reduced revenues by discontinuing certain service offerings. 
In addition, these changes may reduce the attractiveness of our 
marketplaces and other services to buyers, sellers, or other users.72 
Alibaba’s business model allows the company to profit from 
the number of merchants, advertising, and sales occurring on its 
platforms.73 To earn profits, Alibaba relies heavily on charging its 
merchants for advertising services and transaction fees.74 Due to its 
large customer base and multiple marketplaces, the amount of 
business transactions on Alibaba trumps those of other e-
commerce platforms. 75  In the third quarter of 2015, Alibaba 
                                                
 71 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 68, at 8. 
 72 See Registration Statement, supra note 26, at 30. 
 73 Yan, supra note 70. 
 74 See Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. 
 75 Id. Because of this business model, Alibaba earns less revenue than other 
online marketplaces, for instance, falling behind Amazon, Google, and eBay, 
respectively, in the third quarter of 2014. For a summary graph, see id. 
Nevertheless, Alibaba still enjoys large profits on its revenue, as the millions of 
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reported a gross merchandise volume 76 of 112 billion dollars, 
compared to eBay’s 19.6 billion and Amazon’s 25.4 billion.77 
Taobao, Alibaba’s largest online marketplace, is one of the 
world’s largest shopping websites, with 7 million vendors listing 
800 million products.78 The website offers a variety of items for 
sale, from outerwear to folding bicycles. 79  In January 2015, 
China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(“SAIC”) estimated that two thirds of products offered on Taobao 
were counterfeit.80 Of the 58,000 Dahon folding bikes for sale on 
Taobao, Dahon estimates up to half are counterfeit or infringe 
upon its intellectual property.81 According to David Hon, chief 
                                                                                                         
merchants who use its shopping platforms heavily rely on purchasing ads to 
market and differentiate their products. Id. 
76  Gross Merchandise Volume is “the total value of successfully closed 
transactions” in a certain quarter. EBAY, Ebay Fast Facts At-A-Glance (Q3 
2015), available at https://static.ebayinc.com/static/assets/Uploads/PressRoom/ 
eBay-Factsheet-Q3-2015.pdf?2 (last visited November 20, 2015).  
77   See id.; ALIBABA, Alibaba Group Announces September Quarter 2015 
Results (2015), available at http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/ 
press_pdf/p151027.pdf (last visited November 20, 2015); AMAZON, 
Amazon.com Announces Third Quarter Sales Up 23% to $25.4 Billion (2015), 
available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9N 
Tk4NzcwfENoaWxkSUQ9MzA5MjM4fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1 (last visited 
November 20, 2015).  
 78 Kathy Chu & Laurie Burkett, Knockoffs Thrive on Alibaba’s Taobao, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (April 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424 
052702304049904579517642158573008. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 68, at 8; OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2015 Special 301 Report, 40 (2015), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-301-Report-FINAL.pdf (last 
visited October 30, 2015); 5 risks for investors buying Alibaba shares, CNN 
MONEY (HONG KONG), (Sept. 17, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/16/ 
investing/alibaba-ipo-risks/. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 
68, at 8 (“The SAIC report is no longer available on the SAIC website. 
According to unofficial translations of the report (see, e.g., 
http://money.163.com/15/0129/13/AH4N7AAK00254TFQ.html), SAIC faulted 
Alibaba Group for failing to take effective measures to address a range of 
problems, including against trademark infringement, for requiring parties to 
waive claims to operator liability, and for imposing unreasonable burdens on 
consumers who wish to file complaints.”). 
 81 Chu & Burkett, supra note 78. 
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executive of Dahon, the number of counterfeit Dahon bicycles 
have multiplied by ten or twenty times as much, from 2012 to 
2014.82 Dahon spends about $200,000 dollars per year and employs 
four full-time staff members to combat counterfeiting. 83  Hon 
purports that despite Dahon’s persistent complaints to Taobao, 
“[t]he [counterfeiters] stop doing this for a while, and then a few 
months later, they resurface and open another store.”84 
Columbia Sportswear has a similar story. Jack Motley, the 
director of intellectual property at Columbia Sportswear, asserts 
that the brand asks Alibaba to remove up to 3,000 counterfeit 
listings per month.85 However, given that there are about 100,000 
listings for purportedly “authentic” Columbia products on Taobao, 
the fight against knock-offs is seemingly endless. 86  In 2013, 
Columbia Sportswear purchased hundreds of listings claiming to 
be genuine Columbia products on Taobao, and determined that 
82% of products purchased were counterfeit.87 
B. The Gucci Complaint 
Due to counterfeiting issues like the ones noted above, in May 
2015, Kering SA,88 the owner of a group of luxury fashion brands 
filed a complaint against Alibaba in the Southern District of New 
York alleging that the e-commerce retailer knowingly facilitated its 
users’ sales of counterfeit Gucci, Yves Saint Laurent, Balenciaga, 
                                                
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Yan, supra note 70. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Kering is a “growing Group of high-profile, profitable brands that create 
apparel and accessories for the luxury and sport & lifestyle markets,” 
representing such brands as Gucci, Botegga Veneta, Saint Laurent, Alexander 
McQueen, Balenciaga, Brioni, Christopher Kane, McQ, Stella McCartney, 
Tomas Maier, Sergio Rossi, Boucheron, Dodo, Girard-Perregaux, 
JEANRICHARD, Pomellato, Qeelin, Ulysse Nardin, Puma, Volcom, Cobra, and 
Electric. KERING, Who we are, http://www.kering.com/en/group/about-kering 
(last visited October 29, 2015). 
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and Bottega Veneta goods.89 Specifically, the complaint alleges 
that: 
[t]he Alibaba defendants facilitate and encourage the sale of an 
enormous number of counterfeit products through their self-described 
‘ecosystem,’ which provides manufacturers, sellers, and buyers of 
counterfeit goods with a marketplace for such goods, and provides 
online marketing, credit card processing, financing, and shipping 
services that effectuate the sale of the Counterfeit Products.90  
In 2014, Kering pursued a “nearly identical” lawsuit against 
Alibaba, 91  referred to as the “Initial Action,” 92  and was even 
awarded a preliminary injunction against Alibaba;93 however, the 
complaint was withdrawn after the parties reached a settlement 
agreement in August 2014.94 Kering re-filed the lawsuit against 
Alibaba because it failed to comply with the terms of the 
settlement, namely, its agreement to assist Kering in reducing 
counterfeit sales on Alibaba.95 Through a spokesperson, Alibaba 
has publicly denied that the complaint has any merit and 
emphasized its “strong track record” of working with brands to 
                                                
 89 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 3; see also Luxury Brands 
are Suing Alibaba over the Sale of Counterfeit Goods, THE FASHION LAW (May 
18, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/luxury-brands-are-suing-alibaba-over-
the-sale-of-counterfeit-goods/ (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba 
litigation). 
 90 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4; see also The Fashion 
Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba litigation). 
 91 The Fashion Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and 
Alibaba litigation). 
 92 See Complaint, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 14-cv-
5119 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3. 
 93 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3. 
 94 See Notice Of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Against Certain 
Defendants at 2, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No.14-cv-5119 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); see Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3. See also 
Lulu Yilun Chen, Alibaba Cooperates With Kering After Fakes Suit Withdrawn; 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-08-11/alibaba-cooperates-with-kering-after-fakes-suit-withdrawn; 
The Fashion Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and 
Alibaba litigation). 
 95 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3.; see also The Fashion 
Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba litigation). 
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battle counterfeiting.96 In September, the plaintiffs were awarded a 
permanent injunction and statutory damages pursuant to the 
Lanham Act97 against individual merchant defendants, a small step 
towards victory for the luxury brands.98 
Conversely, Kering’s first amended complaint alleges that 
while Alibaba’s policies appear to address counterfeiting issues, 
they were purposely designed to allow counterfeiters to continue 
with business as usual on their websites Alibaba.com, 
AliExpress.com, and Taobao.com, collectively referred to as the 
“Alibaba Marketplaces.”99 For instance, Alibaba’s “three strike 
rule” for users selling counterfeits is only applied “if each instance 
of infringement involves the same trademark.”100 Moreover, the 
complaint alleges that the Alibaba defendants did not recognize 
U.S. trademark registrations for takedown notices 101  brought 
                                                
 96 In a written statement, an Alibaba Spokeswoman spoke on behalf of the 
company:  
We continue to work in partnership with numerous brands to help them 
protect their intellectual property, and we have a strong track record of 
doing so . . . Unfortunately, Kering Group has chosen the path of 
wasteful litigation instead of the path of constructive cooperation. We 
believe this complaint has no basis and we will fight it vigorously. 
Russell Flannery, Alibaba Criticizes Gucci Owner Kering for ‘Wasteful 
Litigation,’ Cites Own IP Record, FORBES (May 17, 2015, 11:02 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2015/05/17/alibaba-criticizes-gucci-
owner-kering-for-wasteful-ligitation-cites-own-ip-record/. See also The Fashion 
Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba litigation). 
97 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012). 
 98 Default Judgment at 3, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 
15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 99 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4. 
 100 First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 4. 
 101 A takedown notice occurs, pursuant to Alibaba’s Policy, when a trademark 
owner submits to Alibaba that a user is infringing on trademark rights and/or 
selling counterfeit products. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 
7, 91; ALIBABA, IPR Protection Policy (Updated February 10, 2014), 
http://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2049.htm (last visited October 29, 2015) 
(“Intellectual property right holders shall use AliProtect 
(http://legal.alibaba.com/index.htm) to file intellectual property infringement 
claims for centralized processing. Access to AliProtect is also located under the 
“Help” tab on the top right corner of the front webpage at the Site. 
AliProtect provides an efficient and transparent channel for intellectual property 
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against Taobao.com sellers, “even though that site specifically 
targets U.S. consumers . . . .”102 Kering argues that by allowing 
counterfeiters to continue to operate despite “hav[ing] been 
expressly and specifically informed that merchants are selling 
counterfeits, and even when the merchants themselves state openly 
that they are selling counterfeits,” Alibaba “permit[s] and 
encourage[s]” such counterfeiting activities.103 By providing the e-
commerce marketplace for counterfeiters storefronts, essential 
business support services, marketing and logistical services, and 
key word advertising, Alibaba “actively assisted” to “attract 
customers to buy Counterfeit Products . . . .”104 
III. OVERVIEW OF SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT IN THE U.S. UNDER THE TIFFANY STANDARD 
Trademark law serves two purposes: to protect brands from 
unfair competition and to protect consumers from deception.105 
From an economic standpoint, trademarks serve as source 
identifiers; symbols allowing consumers to identify goods or 
services that bring satisfaction or reject those that have failed to do 
so.106 Trademarks enable consumers to distinguish between similar 
                                                                                                         
right holders to file intellectual property infringement claims and request 
takedown of allegedly infringing listings from the Site. Three types of materials 
must be submitted to AliProtect to facilitate processing of intellectual property 
infringement claims, namely: 1. Proof of identity of the complaining party and 
relevant authorization if the complaining party is not the intellectual property 
right holder; 2. Proof of intellectual property ownership; 3. Exact clickable 
hyperlinks to the relevant allegedly infringing listings on the Site.”) 
 102 First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 4. 
 103 Id. at 7. 
 104 Id. at 7–9. 
 105  J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, § 2:2 (4th ed. 2015).  
 106 Id. at § 2:3. See also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 
1968) (“Preservation of the trademark as a means of identifying the trademark 
owner’s products . . . . serves an important public purpose. It makes effective 
competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a 
means through which the consumer can identify products which please him and 
reward the producer with continued patronage. Without some means of product 
identification, informed consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in 
quality, could not exist.”). 
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products by different companies. 107  Thus “without trademarks, 
[t]here could be no pride of workmanship, no credit for good 
quality, no responsibility for bad.”108 Counterfeiters who infringe 
upon others’ trademarks reduce the value of brands by assuming 
the brand owner’s mark and established reputation as their own, 
while simultaneously confusing consumers as to the quality and 
origin of such products or services.109 Counterfeiters are considered 
“economic parasite[s] who must be enjoinable by the law,” 
otherwise their actions threaten to destroy the nature of quality 
assurance.110 
A. The Lanham Act 
In the United States, the Lanham Act111 serves as the federal 
statutory source of trademark protection. The Lanham Act 
originated in the Commerce Clause112 and aims “to promote fair 
and efficient competition.”113 Generally, for a brand owner to 
establish trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, it must 
prove that its mark is entitled to protection and the infringer’s use 
                                                
 107 See McCarthy, supra  note 105 at § 2:3. 
 108 Id. at § 2:4 (4th ed. 2015) (quoting Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social 
Function of Trademarks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 175 (1949)). 
 109 Id. at § 2:5. Judge Learned Hand explained: 
His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which 
bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows 
the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own 
control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, 
or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face is the symbol 
of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask. 
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 110 McCarthy, supra note 105, at § 2:5. 
 111 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012). 
 112 United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, 
Inc., 128 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The history and text of the Lanham Act show 
that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress’s intent to legislate the limits of its 
authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to 
profit-seeking uses of trademark.”) 
 113 2 BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN-SOURCE CASEBOOK 29 
(2015) (ebook), http://tmcasebook.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ 
BeebeTMLaw-2.0-Introduction.pdf (providing background on trademark 
infringement under the Lanham Act). 
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of the mark in commerce is likely to cause confusion for 
consumers.114 The Lanham Act specifically provides for direct 
liability, occurring when a trademark owner seeks to hold an 
infringer liable.115 
B. Secondary Liability 
However, liability for trademark infringement is not only 
limited to those who directly sell goods or services that infringe 
upon the trademark rights of others.116 The doctrine of secondary 
liability allows a trademark owner to hold a third party responsible 
for a direct infringer’s actions, in certain circumstances. The 
Lanham Act does not explicitly provide for secondary liability;117 
rather, it is “an entirely judge-made doctrine” relying on the 
common law.118 Secondary liability lawsuits can be more efficient 
and thus preferable for trademark owners because they permit “the 
mark owner to secure, in a single proceeding, relief against a party 
whose conduct is simultaneously enabling multiple acts of 
                                                
 114 See id. at 3–4 (providing background on trademark infringement under the 
Lanham Act). 
 115 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).  
 116 McCarthy, supra note 105 at § 25:17. 
 117 The Lanham Act states: 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant – (a) use in 
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation 
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection 
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or cause mistake, or 
to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a 
registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or 
colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, 
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or 
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or 
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such 
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, 
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies 
hereinafter provided. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1) (2012). See also Beebe, supra note 114, at 279. 
 118  Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine that 
derives from the common law of torts.”). See also McCarthy, supra note 105, at 
§ 25:17. 
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infringement by a number of primary infringers.”119 Two branches 
of secondary liability exist: vicarious infringement and 
contributory infringement.120 
1. Vicarious Infringement   
Generally, vicarious liability will occur when a third party is 
liable for an infringer’s action based on the relationship between 
the two.121 Vicarious liability for trademark infringement occurs 
when a third party and the direct infringer “have an apparent or 
actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in 
transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership of 
control over the infringing product.”122 This theory of liability 
exists as a joint tortfeasor model.123 
2. Contributory Infringement 
Contributory liability is the main source of potential liability 
for indirect trademark infringement. 124  Generally, contributory 
liability may extend trademark infringement liability to “all those 
who knowingly encourage or facilitate illegal and tortious 
activity.” 125  Due to the limited case law, 126  the doctrine of 
contributory trademark infringement is “ill-defined.”127 
                                                
 119  Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online Trademark 
Infringement: The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 463, 463 
(2014). 
 120 Saunders & Berger-Walliser, supra note 5, at 37, 42. 
 121 McCarthy, supra note 105, at § 25:22. 
 122 Id. at § 25:17 (quoting Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession 
Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 123 Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1150 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. 
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309 (2d. Cir. 1963)). See also Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103 
(2d Cir. 2010) (“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created 
doctrine that derives from the common law of torts.”). 
 124 McCarthy, supra note 105 at § 25:17. 
 125 Id. 
 126 The Second Circuit in Tiffany prefaced their discussion of contributory 
liability by first “[a]cknowledging the paucity of case law to guide us.” Tiffany, 
600 F.3d at 103. The Court addressed that the Second Circuit had only 
encountered contributory trademark infringement in two other decisions, “and 
even then in little detail.” Id. at 105. 
 127 Id. See also McCarthy, supra note 105 at § 25:17. 
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a. The Inwood Test 
Contributory liability for trademark infringement arises under 
the Inwood test.128 The Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 129  determined whether a drug 
manufacturer could be held vicariously liable for trademark 
infringement in creating a generic pill to mimic the look of a 
trademarked competitor drug. 130  Ives Laboratories is a drug 
manufacturer and seller who received a patent on the drug 
cyclandelate in 1955.131 Until 1972 when the patent expired, Ives 
possessed the exclusive rights to manufacture and sell 
cyclandelate, which it sold under the registered trademark 
Cyclospasmol.132 The drug, a white powder, was sold in blue or 
blue-red gelatin capsules with the Ives name imprinted and 
designated numbers for various doses.133 After the patent expired, 
several generic drug manufacturing companies, including Inwood 
Laboratories, copied the appearance of Cyclospasmol pills, selling 
the cyclandelate drug in identical colored capsules and doses as the 
Cyclospasmol pills.134 Such practices are considered normal in the 
pharmaceutical industry. 135  Pharmacists, whether they are 
dispensing branded Cyclospasmol pills or generic drugs, remove 
the capsules from the manufacturer’s container and dispense them 
into the pharmacist’s own labeled bottle to provide to consumers.136 
Thus, the consumer receives the final product without seeing any 
identifying marks other than what is printed on the capsules 
themselves.137 
Ives Laboratories initiated a trademark infringement action 
against Inwood Laboratories, alleging that the generic 
                                                
 128 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 846. 
 131 Id. 
132 Id.  
 133 Id. at 846–47. 
 134 Id. at 847. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 848–49. 
 137 Id. at 849. 
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manufacturers’ use of identical capsules and catalogs138 comparing 
prices and colors of generic pills effectively induced pharmacists 
to substitute a generic pill for Cyclospasmol, and to mislabel the 
generic substitute as Cyclospasmol. 139  Ives did not claim that 
Inwood itself applied the Cyclospasmol trademark to the drugs it 
manufactured and sold, but rather that Inwood “contributed to the 
infringing activities” of pharmacists who mislabeled the generic 
drugs.140 The District Court denied Ives’ request for a preliminary 
injunction, because Ives did not establish that Inwood conspired 
with the pharmacists who mislabeled the generic drugs.141 The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District 
Court’s ruling, relying on the reasoning of Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow 
Crest Beverages, Inc.142 The Second Circuit articulated that Inwood 
would be liable if it either “suggested, even by implication” that 
the retailers should mislabel the generics or if Inwood continued to 
sell the generic to retailers “whom they knew or had reason to 
know were engaging in infringing practices.”143 
The Supreme Court confirmed that trademark infringement 
liability can extend beyond those who actually infringe upon 
others’ trademarks.144 In certain situations, a manufacturer can be 
liable for the trademark infringement of others within the 
distribution chain, even if the manufacturer does not directly 
                                                
138 Catalogs are a standard marketing tool in the pharmaceutical industry, which 
promote drug manufacturers’ products through distribution to hospitals, retail 
pharmacies, and wholesale buyers. Id. at 847–48.  
 139 Id. at 850. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See id. at 851. 
 142 Inwood, 456 U.S. at 851–52; 64 F. Supp. 980 (D. Mass. 1946), aff’d, 162 
F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947) (“Relying primarily upon Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest 
Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980 (Mass. 1946), aff’d 162 F.2d 280 (CA1), cert. 
denied, 332 U.S. 809, 68 S.Ct. 110, 92 L.Ed. 386 (1947), the court stated that 
the petitioners would be liable under § 32 either if they suggested, even by 
implication, that retailers fill bottles with generic cyclandelate and label the 
bottle with Ives’ trademark or if the petitioners continued to sell cyclandelate to 
retailers whom they knew or had reason to know were engaging in infringing 
practices.”). 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. at 853–54.  
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control them.145 The Supreme Court then articulated what is now 
known as the Inwood test:  
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one 
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially 
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.146 
 Thus, Inwood was only liable to Ives for the pharmacists’ 
trademark infringement if it intentionally induced the pharmacists 
to mislabel the generics, or if it continued to provide the generics 
to the pharmacists, knowing that the pharmacists were mislabeling 
the generics.147 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that Ives 
failed to make either showing of fact to the District Court.148 
The Inwood test—now thirty-three years old—has been 
criticized in recent years for its inadequate application to modern 
e-commerce contexts. 149  Inwood can be difficult to apply to 
Internet marketplaces because such platforms allow users to 
generate listings and often do not possess actual knowledge of 
trademark infringement until they are notified of such, if they ever 
possess such knowledge.150 As a result, the level of knowledge 
required by the Inwood test weighs in favor of e-commerce 
platforms, due to “intentionally inducing” or “continuing to 
supply” serving as difficult standards for trademark owners to 
prove, by the very nature of internet commerce.151 
b. Common Fact Patterns in Secondary Liability 
In recent years, two common fact patterns have emerged in 
secondary liability litigation. 152  Search engines have been the 
recipients of lawsuits for selling keyword advertising that resulted 
                                                
 145 Id. at 854. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. at 855. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Justin N. Redman, Post Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. EBay, Inc.: Establishing A 
Clear, Legal Standard For Online Auctions, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 467, 484 (2009). 
 150 Id. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See Dinwoodie, supra note 119, at 466. 
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in trademark infringement.153 Online auction websites have also 
been the subject of claims alleging that the websites should be 
responsible for users who engage in illicit counterfeiting and 
trademark infringement activities. 154  Secondary liability claims 
require courts to balance a trademark owner’s rights with the 
advancement of technology.155 
c. The Tiffany Standard 
In the United States, Tiffany v. eBay has essentially become 
“the law of the land,” governing online marketplace liability for 
users’ trademark infringement. 156  Tiffany & Co. is known 
throughout the world for its luxury goods, which include jewelry, 
crystal, and china.157 eBay is an online auction marketplace website 
which enables users to purchase and sell goods directly to and 
from each other.158  Prior to 2004, Tiffany became aware that 
counterfeit Tiffany merchandise, namely its branded jewelry, was 
for sale on eBay’s virtual auction marketplace.159 To investigate the 
extent of Tiffany counterfeits on eBay, Tiffany established two 
survey “Buying Programs” in 2004 and 2005, in which the brand 
purchased various “Tiffany” items on eBay, then inspected the 
products to determine how many were counterfeit. 160 
                                                
 153 See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012); 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013). See also 
Dinwoodie, supra note 119, at 466. 
 154 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); L’Oreal 
SA v. eBay Int’l AG [2009] EWHC 1094 (Eng.). See also Dinwoodie, supra 
note 119, at 466. 
 155  See Dinwoodie, supra note 119, at 464. See also Yafit Lev-Aretz, 
Combating Trademark Infringement Online: Secondary Liability v. Partnering 
Facility, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 639, 640–41 (2014) (“Indeed, much ink was 
spilled over the quest for a balanced approach to secondary liability that would 
effectively curb piracy and counterfeiting on the Internet without targeting 
innocent websites or otherwise obstructing the free exchange of ideas.”) 
 156 See Beebe, supra note 113, at 279. 
 157  Elizabeth K. Levin, A Safe Harbor for Trademark: Reevaluating 
Secondary Liability After Tiffany v. Ebay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 500 
(2009). 
 158 Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
 159 See id. 
 160 Id. 
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Approximately 75% of “Tiffany” goods purchased in the 2004 and 
2005 Buying Programs were knockoffs.161 Although the district 
court found flawed methodology in the Buying Programs, it 
determined that from 2004 to 2005, a “significant portion of the 
‘Tiffany’ sterling silver jewelry listed on the eBay website . . . was 
counterfeit,” and that eBay knew “that some portion of the Tiffany 
goods sold on its website might be counterfeit.”162 
eBay earns revenue in two ways: by charging fees to the 
vendors who list their items on its website, and through charging 
transaction fees via its payment processing company, PayPal.163 
“Insertion fees” are charged for each listed item, calculated based 
on the product’s starting price, ranging from $0.20 to $4.80 per 
item.164 When a sale is completed, eBay obtains a “final value fee,” 
which is between 5.25% and 10% of the item’s final sale price.165 
For an additional cost, eBay also offers vendors additional services 
to differentiate their listings, such as the option of including a 
border or bold type face.166 eBay-owned PayPal charges vendors a 
transaction fee for each processed sale, from 1.9% to 2.9% of the 
sale, plus $0.30.167 Because of this business model, eBay’s revenue 
increases proportional to the number of products listed for sale and 
the price of the products sold.168 
The auction website facilitates numerous sales of Tiffany 
items, both genuine and counterfeit; from April 2000 to June 2004, 
eBay earned $4.1 million dollars in revenue from product listings 
with the word “Tiffany” in the title in the Jewelry & Watches 
group. 169  Although eBay undoubtedly generates revenue from 
every sale on its website, counterfeit or otherwise, the district court 
                                                
 161 Id. In 2004, counterfeits discovered from the buying program totaled 
73.1%; in 2005, 75.5%. Id. 
 162 Id. at 98 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 507 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 163 See Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 98. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 97. 
 168 Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
 169 Id. at 98. 
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recognized the company’s “interest in eliminating counterfeit 
Tiffany merchandise from eBay . . . to preserve the reputation of 
its website as a safe place to do business.”170 After customers 
purchase fraudulent Tiffany goods purporting to be authentic, they 
may blame eBay.171 
eBay’s business model serves to limits its liability, as it merely 
provides a venue for the sale of goods and services for the 
transactions, but does not itself act as the seller.172 eBay never 
physically possesses the items for sale on its website, and generally 
does not know whether items sold are in fact ever delivered to 
buyers.173 Because it never possessed or inspected the items for sale 
in the “Tiffany” listings, eBay was limited in its ability to discern 
whether or not such goods were counterfeit.174 Furthermore, eBay 
lacked the expertise to discern whether the Tiffany products for 
sale were genuine or counterfeit, even if it had an opportunity to 
inspect the items.175 
In 2010, the Second Circuit examined whether eBay was 
responsible for contributory trademark infringement of its vendors 
selling counterfeit Tiffany goods.176 The court determined that 
eBay was not contributorially liable for facilitating the sale of 
counterfeits, when certain vendors sold counterfeit Tiffany 
jewelry.177 Tiffany argued that eBay should be liable under the 
second prong of the Inwood test because eBay permitted 
counterfeit sellers to use its services and platform “while knowing 
or having reason to know that such sellers were infringing 
                                                
 170 Id. (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 486, 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 171 Id. eBay in fact received complaints from buyers regarding the purchase of 
knockoff Tiffany merchandise. “[D]uring the last six weeks of 2004, 125 
consumers complained to eBay about purchasing ‘Tiffany’ items through the 
eBay website that they believed to be counterfeit.” Id. (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. 
v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 486, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 172 Id. at 98. 
 173 Id. at 97. 
 174 Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98 (2d. Cir. 2010). 
 175 Id. at 98. 
 176 See id. at 103. 
 177 Id. 
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Tiffany’s mark.”178 The Court applied the Inwood test to service 
providers, 179  concluding that eBay’s generalized knowledge of 
counterfeit Tiffany jewelry sales on its website was not an 
adequate level of knowledge to impose an affirmative duty upon 
eBay to remedy the issue.180 
Thus under Tiffany, “a service provider must have more than a 
general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used 
to sell counterfeit goods.”181 Similarly, a service provider may not 
use the defense of “willful blindness,” meaning “[w]hen it has 
reason to suspect that users of its service are infringing a protected 
mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular 
infringing transactions by looking the other way.”182 For liability 
purposes, a service provider who is willfully blind to counterfeit 
sales is as culpable as a service provider who has actual knowledge 
of counterfeit sales.183 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit went beyond the scope of the 
Inwood test to provide reasoning for why eBay was not liable for 
contributory infringement for its users selling counterfeit Tiffany 
merchandise on its platform.184 The Court discussed practicality in 
determining which party should bear the burden of policing 
counterfeiters on eBay, insisting that “[t]o impose liability because 
eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness of all the purported Tiffany 
products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful 
resale of genuine Tiffany goods.”185 Primarily, the Second Circuit 
emphasized eBay’s anti-counterfeiting measures, another factor 
                                                
 178 Id. at 106. 
179 Id. at 104. The Court noted that Inwood “applies on its face to manufacturers 
and distributors of goods,” however the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have applied 
the test to service providers in cases such as Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. 
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry 
Auction, Inc. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); and Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 180 Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 107. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 109. 
 183 Id. at 110 (quoting Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149) (“[W]illful 
blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.”) . 
 184 Id. at 109–10. 
 185 Id. at 103. 
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absent from the Inwood test.186 Although eBay generally knew that 
some of the purported Tiffany merchandise sold on its website was 
counterfeit, the Second Circuit stressed, “[w]ithout more, however, 
this knowledge is insufficient to trigger liability under Inwood.”187 
Thus, even though eBay was aware that vendors were using its 
platform to sell counterfeit Tiffany goods, it was not legally 
obligated to act until it had notice that specific items for sale were 
counterfeit.188 Every time Tiffany reported a counterfeit listing, 
eBay removed it.189 From 2003-2007, eBay’s policy consisted of 
removing such listings within 24 hours of receiving a NOCI; in 
fact, eBay deleted seventy to eighty percent of reported listings 
within twelve hours of receiving a notification.190 During the same 
period of time, eBay removed nearly 285,000 reported counterfeit 
Tiffany listings from its website, through its Verified Rights 
Owner (‘VeRO’) program.191 eBay’s anti-counterfeiting measures 
set the bar high for other e-commerce platforms whose users sell 
counterfeit on such websites. Ultimately, the Second Circuit agreed 
with the district court’s ruling that “eBay consistently took steps to 
improve its technology and develop anti-fraud measures as such 
                                                
 186 Id. at 109–10 (“eBay did not ignore the information it was given about 
counterfeit sales on its website.”) Id. at 110. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 107 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 
508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)) (“The district court concluded that ‘while eBay clearly 
possessed general knowledge as to counterfeiting on its website, such 
generalized knowledge is insufficient under the Inwood test to impose upon 
eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the problem.’”) 
 189 Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d. Cir. 2010); (“[I]t is 
undisputed that eBay promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as 
counterfeit and took affirmative steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany 
goods.”) 
 190 See id. at 99. 
 191 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“Specifically, Tiffany reported 20,915 listings in 2003; 45,242 listings in 2004; 
59,012 listings in 2005; and 134,779 listings in 2006. As of September 30, 2007, 
shortly before trial, Tiffany had reported 24,201 listings for 2007. All told, 
Tiffany reported 284,149 listings through the VeRO Program.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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measures became technologically feasible and reasonably 
available.”192 
Undoubtedly, eBay went beyond merely cooperating with 
Tiffany’s takedown notices, it took an active role in preventing 
counterfeiting on its own website with numerous effective 
mechanisms in place, such as hiring Trust and Safety department 
staff to combat counterfeiting and implementing a myriad of an 
anti-counterfeiting measures such as buyer protection programs, a 
fraud engine, and the VeRO program, among others.193 eBay’s 
exemplary anti-counterfeiting procedures serve as a difficult 
standard for other e-commerce platforms to follow, which in fact 
assists brand owners. Although actual knowledge may be a 
difficult standard for trademark owners to prove under the Inwood 
test, certainly the abundance of anti-counterfeiting measures 
discussed at length in Tiffany will serve as a strict standard to 
evaluate other e-commerce platforms’ policies. 
IV. APPLYING TIFFANY TO GUCCI: WHY THE PLAINTIFF’S 
SECONDARY LIABILITY ARGUMENT SHOULD PREVAIL 
Due to the sheer volume of knockoffs available for sale, 
counterfeiters on Alibaba pose a greater threat to trademark owners 
than those who sell on other websites such as eBay.194 Whereas 
individual eBay vendors may offer a limited number of knockoff 
handbags to direct customers, Alibaba vendors are able to also 
offer a wholesale approach promising low prices per unit for large 
quantity knockoff orders.195 In one instance referenced in the First 
Amended Complaint, a counterfeit Gucci handbag was priced 
between $2-$5 per unit, for a minimum order of 2,000 units and a 
maximum order of up to 50,000 units.196 In contrast, the genuine 
Gucci handbag retails for $795.197 
                                                
 192 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 100 (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 463, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 193 Id. at 98–01 (discussing eBay’s range of anti-counterfeiting measures). 
 194 The Economist, supra note 11. 
 195 See id. 
 196 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 55. Other Alibaba vendors 
offer to produce 10,000 units per week or up to 500,000 units per month. See id. 
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A. Alibaba’s Anti-Counterfeiting Policies 
Alibaba maintains that it is also a victim of counterfeiting and 
that it tirelessly works against such efforts.198 In an Interview with 
Xinhua,199 Ma expressed that counterfeiting hurts Alibaba, as the 
sale of one fake product could create the loss of five customers.200 
The company employs over 2,000 staff members dedicated to 
addressing counterfeiting issues, including reviewing listings 
flagged suspicious by brand owners and removing fraudulent 
listings.201 However, many brands deny that Alibaba’s efforts are 
genuine, as these policies amount to lenient sanctions for vendors 
who are found to sell counterfeit goods.202 Alibaba’s current policy 
strictly prohibits vendors listing “counterfeits, replicas, or other 
unauthorized items” for sale on the website.203 Listings of such 
items “shall be subject to removal” by Alibaba. 204  Alibaba 
separates prohibited items into two categories: “General 
infringements” and “Serious infringements.”205 
                                                                                                         
at 65. One counterfeit vendor on Alibaba purported a maximum order capacity 
of an astounding 8,000,000 units per month. See id. at 81. 
 197 See id. at 54. 
 198 The Economist, supra note 11. 
 199 Xinhua is China’s “primary provider of major and authoritative news.” 
Brief Introduction to Xinhuanet, XINHUA, http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english2010/special/2011-11/28/c_131274495.htm (last visited October 29, 
2015). 
 200 Ma responded, “I don’t believe success can [be] built on dishonesty,” when 
addressing comments suggesting that Alibaba may benefit from counterfeiting. 
Counterfeits hurt Alibaba, Chinese ecomony: Jack Ma, XINHUA (October 12, 
2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/12/c_134707013.htm. 
 201 The Economist, supra note 11. 
 202 John Ruwitch, Alibaba lobbies to stay off U.S. blacklist list for fakes, 
REUTERS (October 18, 2015 12:26 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/ 
10/18/us-alibaba-counterfeits-idUSKCN0SC04620151018. 
 203  Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection Policy, ALIBABA, 
http://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2049.htm (last visited September 13, 2015). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Enforcement Actions for Intellectual Property Right Infringement Claims 
(Updated Apr. 8, 2015), ALIBABA, http://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2043.htm 
(last visited September 13, 2015) [hereinafter Alibaba]. 
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1. Penalties for “General Infringements” 
“General infringements” include the unfair use of trademark 
rights in product descriptions, hyperlinks, on offer or sale of 
products, or confusing or misleading product descriptions. 206 
Sanctions for general infringement exists on a points scale, with 
remedies ranging from issuing a severe warning to terminating 
one’s membership.207 For instance, an image copyright complaint 
will assign users six penalty points incurred per infringement, as 
will a complaint by an intellectual property owner.208 If a listing is 
removed by Alibaba through a “random check,” a user will incur 
0.2 penalty point, with a maximum of six points per day.209 If 
Alibaba itself removes a listing by a “random check” for either 
using a variation of a trademark or listing an infringing product 
under an incorrect category, each listing will penalize a user by 
two penalty points, with a maximum of twelve points per day.210 
The severity of penalties increases with the amount of points users 
accrue: six equals a severe warning; twelve points prohibits a user 
for posting products for seven days; twenty-four points blocks a 
user’s search results for seven days and restricts Request for 
Quotations 211 for seven days; thirty-six points blocks a user’s 
search results for fourteen days and restricts Request for Quotation 
for fourteen days; and forty-eight points ultimately terminates a 
user’s membership. 212  Alibaba notes that penalty points are 
recorded “for a 365 day period”; they seemingly will return back to 
zero after a year.213 
                                                
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 A Request for Quotation is a detailed compilation of a buyer’s sourcing 
requirements which must be submitted to Alibaba before a supplier receives it 
and trade may begin. See ALIBABA, About RFQ, http://service.alibaba.com/ 
ensupplier/faq_detail/13810245.htm?spm=5386.1678117.1699655.7.vZNE2p&i
d=13810245 (last visited October 29, 2015). 
 212 Alibaba, supra note 205. 
 213 Id. In one instance, a merchant who received between 24 and 47 points was 
still allowed to sell products on Alibaba during the next year. Although the seller 
did not start the new year at 0 points, the seller started with half of the points it 
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2. Penalties for “Serious Infringements” 
“Serious infringements” include the offer or sale of products 
unauthorized by trademark owners or licensees. 214  Serious 
infringement sanctions exist on a three or four-strike system, with 
penalties ranging from a warning to account termination. 215 
However, it is critical to note that Alibaba users will only move up 
the strike system if the same intellectual property owner reports the 
same infringing listing more than once.216 
The first strike for an infringement complaint results in a 
warning, and Alibaba instructs that “[a]ll complaints shall be 
counted as the first infringement within the first five days 
regardless of the number of complaints. ”217 The second strike 
results in restricting the user from listing products, as well as 
blocking search results and the mini-site for seven days.218 The 
third strike either results in restricting the user from listing 
products and blocking search results and the mini-site for fourteen 
days, or account termination. 219 Alibaba specifies that account 
termination is appropriate as a third strike “where the member has 
been complained by an identical rights holder based on an identical 
                                                                                                         
had in the previous year. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 
141–42. 
 214 Alibaba, supra note 205. 
 215 Id.  
 216 Id. This policy purportedly “allows merchants to continue to sell 
Counterfeit Products as long as they are not caught selling products that infringe 
identical trademarks on three different dates.” Second Amended Complaint, 
supra note 18, at 145. 
 217 Alibaba, supra note 205.  
 218 Id. “For example, if a counterfeiter is caught offering a counterfeit version 
of one of Gucci’s products on one day and then is caught offering a counterfeit 
version of a different Gucci mark on a second day, the Alibaba Defendants do 
not consider that merchant to have earned two ‘strikes,’ and the merchant can 
continue to offer Counterfeit Products until they are caught offering products 
that infringe on at least four separate occasions.” Second Amended Complaint, 
supra note 18, at 145. 
 219 Alibaba, supra note 205. 
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intellectual property,” the same standard for the strike system.220 
The fourth strike ultimately results in account termination.221 
Alibaba notes that if it receives multiple complaints based on a 
single infringing listing within the same day, all of the complaints 
together shall count merely as one serious infringement.222 As with 
“General Infringements,” Alibaba instructs that “the number of 
serious infringements shall be recorded on a rolling basis for a 
365-day period;” users seemingly return back to zero after a 
year.223 
Unsurprisingly, these vague, confusing policies have been 
heavily criticized by brand owners as ineffective.224 Recently, the 
American Apparel and Footwear Association (“AAFA”) urged the 
U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to reinstate Alibaba on the 
USTR’s blacklist, citing the company’s “unwillingness to make 
serious reforms” to their anti-counterfeiting measures, and for 
ignoring the AAFA’s concerns.225 In July 2015, the AAFA wrote 
an open letter to Jack Ma, calling for changes to Alibaba’s anti-
counterfeiting policies as a result of failed negotiations over the 
years.226 The AAFA’s requests were simple: that Alibaba “begin 
addressing counterfeits in a manner that is transparent, 
comprehensible, and fast.”227 Although the AAFA opposed the 
                                                
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. “Alibaba considers one report of counterfeit offerings to be one ‘strike’ 
no matter how many individual Counterfeit Products or types of Counterfeit 
Products the merchant is offering.” Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, 
at 145. 
 223 Alibaba, supra note 205. 
 224 See Ruwitch, supra note 202. 
 225 Id. 
 226  AAFA Calls For Alibaba To Implement New, Transparent Anti-
Counterfeiting Measures, AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION 
(July 17, 2015), https://www.wewear.org/aafa-calls-for-alibaba-to-implement-
new-transparent-anti-counterfeiting-measures/. 
 227 AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, LETTER TO JACK MA 2 
(July 17, 2015), available at https://www.wewear.org/assets/1/7/AAFA_Letter_ 
to_Jack_Ma___Attachment_7.17.15.pdf. Attached to the letter was a suggested 
strategy to remove counterfeits from Alibaba’s platforms, consisting of four 
elements: “easy brand certification,” “brand-controlled take-downs,” “brand-
approved sales,” and “transparent verification of progress.” Id. at 3. 
17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 144, 176	  
A Balanced Approach to Secondary Liability 
USTR’s removal of Taobao from the blacklist in 2012, it has not 
recommended re-listing the website until recently. This decision 
occurred as a result of four years of unproductive discussions that 
did not amount to progress in addressing Alibaba’s issues, 
according to AAFA spokeswoman Catherine Michael.228 
B. Comparing Alibaba to eBay, through the Tiffany Lens 
Kering alleges that Alibaba possesses both actual knowledge of 
counterfeiting on its platforms, and employs ineffective policies, 
which seemingly discipline users, while in reality permit such 
users to maintain their business as usual.229 
Under the Tiffany standard, an e-commerce platform is 
contributorially liable for trademark infringement if it permits 
individuals to use its services, knowing or having reason to know 
that such individuals are selling counterfeit items.230 The platform 
must have more than a general awareness of counterfeiting on its 
website; essentially, it must have specific knowledge of counterfeit 
sales, by individual users, and fail to mitigate these transactions.231 
1. eBay’s Level of Knowledge 
eBay, like Alibaba, provides both a marketplace for sale of 
goods and support services for such purchases, but does not sell the 
items or physically possess them.232 The district court noted that 
eBay possessed “an interest in eliminating counterfeit Tiffany 
merchandise from eBay . . . to preserve the reputation of its 
website as a safe place to do business.”233 eBay reportedly spent up 
                                                
 228 Other critics of Alibaba’s removal of counterfeit listings include the 
Trademark Working Group, whose members include Fortune 500 companies 
and other major brands, as well as ANDEMA, a Spanish anti-counterfeiting 
group representing seventy companies including the brands Levi’s and Camper. 
Ruwitch, supra note 202. 
 229 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4. 
 230 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 231 See id. 
 232 Id. at 97. 
 233 Id. at 98 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
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to twenty million dollars each year to facilitate anti-counterfeiting 
measures on its marketplace.234 
eBay also partnered with PayPal, its credit card processing 
company, to create “buyer protection programs” where purchasers 
could obtain refunds for items bought on eBay that turned out to be 
counterfeit.235 It created a Trust and Safety department comprised 
of four thousand employees to address “trust and safety issues.”236 
Two hundred Trust and Safety employees specifically “focus 
exclusively on combating infringement,” and seventy “work 
exclusively with law enforcement.” 237  In addition, eBay 
implemented a “fraud engine” devoted to search for listings that 
violate eBay’s counterfeit policies, including filters and keywords 
specific to the Tiffany brand.238 
To supplement such efforts, eBay also managed a “Verified 
Rights Owner (‘VeRO’) Program,” consisting of a “notice-and-
takedown system,” where brand owners and trademark owners 
could report instances of counterfeiting and intellectual property 
violations on eBay listings. 239  Once eBay received a reported 
listing, its policy was to remove such listing within twenty-four 
hours; in most cases, removing listings within twelve hours of 
notification.240 eBay permitted brand owners such as Tiffany to 
maintain “About Me” pages on eBay’s website to warn users of 
potential counterfeits.241 Tiffany’s page specifically noted in bold 
“Most of the purported TIFFANY & CO. silver jewelry and 
                                                
 234 Id. (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. at 98–99. The fraud engine technology was designed to uncover illegal 
and/or counterfeit listings by automatically searching for listings that violate 
eBay’s policies. Id. at 99. It included ninety different Tiffany-specific keywords 
to designate between counterfeit Tiffany goods and listings for legitimate items. 
Id. 
 239 Id.  
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. Such pages also served to educate eBay users of the “products, 
intellectual property rights, and legal positions” of brands. Id.  
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packaging available on eBay is counterfeit.”242 eBay also created 
automatic warning messages which appeared when a user would 
list a Tiffany product for sale.243 Although eBay implemented a 
“three strikes rule” governing users’ suspension, it would expedite 
the suspension process after one violation if it was evident that the 
seller offered multiple counterfeit listings and did not otherwise 
appear to be a legitimate seller.244 
2. Alibaba’s Level of Knowledge 
Notably absent from Alibaba’s policies are the straightforward 
and effective anti-counterfeiting measures that eBay enacted in 
Tiffany, undoubtedly a significant reason underlying the Second 
Circuit’s favorable ruling. Unlike eBay, Alibaba did not implement 
measures to ensure the authenticity of items sold on its platform, 
promptly remove reported counterfeit listings, or suspend third 
party sellers from its platform after it was alerted of counterfeit 
listings. 245  Because Alibaba “permit[s] and encourage[s]” 
individual users to continue selling counterfeit goods on Alibaba’s 
various platforms, despite being “expressly and specifically 
informed that the merchants are selling counterfeits, and even 
when the merchants themselves state openly that they are selling 
counterfeits,” under Tiffany, Alibaba should be liable for its users 
trademark infringement.246 Not only did Alibaba both know and 
should have known that it was encouraging the sale of counterfeits, 
                                                
 242 Id. at 100. Tiffany’s About Me page also heeded the warning, “The only 
way you can be certain that you are purchasing a genuine TIFFANY & CO. 
product is to purchase it from a Tiffany & Co. retail store, via our website 
(www.tiffany.com) or through a Tiffany & Co. catalogue. Tiffany & Co. stores 
do not authenticate merchandise. A good jeweler or appraiser may be able to do 
this for you.” Id.  
243 Id. (“These messages instructed the seller to make sure that the item was 
authentic Tiffany merchandise and informed the seller that eBay does not 
tolerate the listing of replica, counterfeit, or otherwise unauthorized items and 
that violation of this policy could result in suspension of [the seller’s] 
account.”). If vendors completed the Tiffany listing, eBay flagged it for review. 
Id. (quoting Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 491) (internal citations omitted).  
 244 Id. 
 245 See id. at 139–48 (listing a number of ways that Alibaba allegedly 
permitted and even facilitated the sale of counterfeit goods on its platforms). 
 246 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 7. 
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it also allegedly continued such practices to profit from the 
transactions.247 
First, due to the very nature of the services it provides, Alibaba 
“knowingly assisted” counterfeiters “in virtually all aspects of their 
illegal operations.”248 Alibaba’s websites provide the marketplace, 
“essential support services,” marketing, logistics, 249  keyword 
advertising, “cloud-based deep learning,” 250  and payment 
processing services 251  that facilitate the sale of counterfeits. 252 
Alibaba even provided micro loans to certain small and medium 
sized merchants who had issues obtaining credit from large 
financial institutions until February 2015.253 
Through “proprietary algorithm” technology, Alibaba uses data 
analytics to anticipate its buyers’ needs, providing them with 
additional merchants and products in an individualized search 
                                                
 247 See id. Alibaba continued to provide its services to counterfeiters even 
after the initial lawsuit was filed in 2014, and despite Gucci’s attempts to 
remove the sale of counterfeits from Alibaba’s websites. Id. 
 248 See id. This is due to the Alibaba ecosystem and the numerous support 
services it offers to its vendors.  
 249 Alibaba provides shipping and services to consumers who purchase items 
on their platforms. Id. at 135. 
 250 Alibaba’s marketing and data collection services create targeted marketing 
and personalized search results to consumers in order to obtain a greater 
conversion rate of sale. See id. at 9, 133–34. 
 251 Alipay, Alibaba’s payment processing service encourages customers to 
purchase items on Alibaba’s marketplaces because it utilizes an escrow service. 
When an item is purchased, the sale’s funds are transferred into an escrow 
account, to be released only when the consumer confirms receipt or fails to 
object within a certain time “it eliminates uncertainty in making purchases over 
the Internet.” Id. at 129–30. Furthermore, Alipay owes an obligation to the credit 
card networks it processes to conduct due diligence on its sellers and the items 
they offer. Id. at 132. The Plaintiffs allege that, in order for Alipay to perform 
such due diligence, it would need to determine whether a merchant is selling 
illegal items. See id. 
 252 See id. at 7–10. 
 253 See id. at 136. To qualify for the loans, merchants must first conduct three 
months of activity on Alibaba platforms. Id. Vendors seeking micro loans were 
evaluated on the basis of “transactional and behavioral data from sellers,” and if 
deemed credit worthy, extended an unsecured loan ranging from 7 to 360 days. 
Id.  
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engine.254 By responding to users’ searches, the algorithms enabled 
consumers to find counterfeit products for sale.255 For instance, 
when a consumer searched for “replica” in Alibaba.com’s search 
bar, Alibaba’s algorithm included “wristwatches” and then led the 
consumer to a counterfeit watch seller.256 
Similarly, Alibaba sold keywords to its vendors, such as 
“replica,” “knockoff,” “imitation,” “synthetic leather,” and the 
Plaintiffs’ trademarks such as “Gucci” or “Balenciaga,” in order 
for counterfeiters to market their products.257 When the Plaintiffs’ 
trademarks were searched on Taobao on or around June 26, 2014, 
Gucci generated 119,000 listings; Balenciaga generated 17,000 
listings; Bottega Veneta generated 42,300 listings; YSL generated 
23,500 listings; and Yves Saint Laurent generated 2,543 listings.258 
Misspellings of the Plaintiffs’ trademarks were also suggested; 
when a consumer would type “Gucci” into a search bar on an 
Alibaba platform, terms such as “cucci” and “guchi” were 
recommended.259 According to its business model, Alibaba gains 
                                                
 254 See id. at 8. 
 255 See id. 
 256 See id. at 6. The Plaintiffs allege that the algorithm design was intentional, 
as Alibaba “inserted the keyword ‘Gucci’ into the metadata on the HTML code 
of web pages generated by such searches alongside the additional keywords 
‘synthetic leather.’” Id. at 74.  
 257 See id. at 8–9, 125–26. (“Importantly, the results that were triggered by the 
use of such [advertisement] keywords were typically given the most prominent 
placement on a search results page, such as in the top right position, and were 
not meaningfully distinguished from the results that are generated through the 
Alibaba Defendants’ algorithmic search process . . . .”). Because the ads were 
not differentiated from the search results, Alibaba’s practice differentiates and 
poses a greater threat to trademark owners than the fact patterns in cases such as 
1-800 Contacts, in which the defendants sold advertising keywords containing 
trademarks, enabling a competitor’s ad to appear with search results. See 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1252-56 (10th Cir. 2013).  
 258 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 126. For complete 
figures of merchant listings resulting from trademark searches on Alibaba.com 
and Taobao.com, see id. at 126–28. 
 259  Id. at 9, 122–23. The Plaintiffs allege that the misspellings were 
deliberately “designed to allow the merchant to evade detection by brand 
owners.” Id. at 123. One merchant, Back to the Guest, described a counterfeit 
Gucci handbag using the keywords “Guchi bag,” “Qucci Handbags,” and “Fake 
Designer Handbag.” Id. at 124. 
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revenue from the sale of keywords whenever a consumer clicks on 
a keyword advertised store.260 On AliExpress.com alone, a search 
conducted for the term “guchi” produced 211 results on or around 
June 6, 2014.261 This number escalated to 2,769 results when the 
same search was repeated on or around July 20, 2015.262 Both 
search results revealed merchants selling counterfeit goods bearing 
Gucci trademarks.263 
Another reason Alibaba possesses specific knowledge of 
counterfeits sold on its website is due to its seller designations of 
“Gold Supplier” and “Assessed Supplier” on Alibaba.com. 264 
Alibaba obtains revenue for this website primarily from each sale 
of “Gold Supplier” designations, a seller membership enabling 
members to create premium online stores with additional features 
and services. 265  Sellers aim to achieve “Gold Supplier” 
designations, as they are more profitable than free unverified 
memberships, where a seller’s products will be listed at the 
bottom.266 “Assessed Supplier” designations are awarded to “Gold 
Suppliers” sellers who have been audited and physically inspected 
by a third party company to reassure customers that Alibaba has 
reviewed such sellers and confirmed that their goods are authentic 
and legal.267 The Plaintiff brands maintain that “Gold Supplier” and 
“Assessed Supplier” sellers, despite such designations, sell 
counterfeits or sell materials to manufacture counterfeits on 
Alibaba.com.268 
                                                
 260 See id. at 9 
 261 See id. at 122–23. 
 262 See id. 
 263 See id. 
 264 See id. at 58–59. 
 265  See id. Gold Supplier services include “product showcase, custom 
clearance, value-added tax, or VAT, refund and other import/export business 
solutions.” Id. at 59. 
 266 See id. For a discussion of Gold Suppliers and Assessed Suppliers selling 
counterfeit listings, see generally id. at 58–74. In one example, a merchant on 
Alibaba.com identified as both a “Gold Supplier” and an “Assessed Supplier” 
listed production capabilities ranging from 300 to 50,000 units of counterfeit 
Gucci wallets per month. Id. at 64–65.  
 267 See id. 
 268 See id. 
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The Taobao marketplace poses a larger threat to trademark 
infringement. The plaintiffs assert that in the thirty days between 
March 22, 2013 and April 22, 2013, over 26,000 counterfeit Gucci 
shoes were sold by at least 1400 shops, and over 37,000 counterfeit 
Gucci handbags were sold by at least 1300 stores on the Taobao 
marketplace alone.269 The complaint alleges that before the Initial 
Action was filed, Taobao would remove a reported infringing 
listing in ten to fifteen days, if at all.270 Additionally, if a seller’s 
infringing listing was removed, the seller would simply resurface 
shortly after to continue selling counterfeits.271 
Similarly, the Plaintiffs allege that Alibaba’s sanctions for 
intellectual property violations, such as the “three strike” policy or 
point-based penalty system were not created to prevent trademark 
infringement and the sale of counterfeit products.272 “Among other 
flaws, the Alibaba Defendants’ purported three strike policy allows 
merchants to continue to sell Counterfeit Products so long as they 
are not caught selling products that infringe identical trademarks 
on three different days.” 273  Moreover, Taobao’s notice and 
takedown policy, recently updated in April 2015, permits the 
marketplace to prioritize received complaints according to the 
rating of the complainant. 274  Such ratings are based on how 
accurate complainants have been in the past: if a trademark owner 
was at least 90% correct that the listings he reported infringed 
intellectual property, a “good” rating will be awarded, resulting in 
take-down requests to be addressed within three business days.275 
Complainants who less than 90% correct, but at least 45% correct 
would earn a “normal” rating with take-down requests addressed 
within three business days.276 Should complainants have a history 
                                                
 269 See id. at 87. 
 270 Id. at 88. Alibaba noted that while other websites address complaints by 
removing listings within twenty-four hours, Alibaba could take weeks to address 
such issues, due to the system automatically rejecting complaints. Id. at 147–48.  
 271 See id. at 88. 
 272 See id. at 141. 
 273 Id. at 145. 
 274 Id. 
 275 See id. 
 276 See id. at 146. 
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of being less than 45% correct with their complaints, they will 
receive a “bad” rating, with no disclosed timeline to address their 
complaints. 277  The Plaintiffs assert that Alibaba allows its 
merchants to avoid sanctions from takedown notices by 
unreasonably delaying responses to complaints by brand owners, 
as well as by inadequately addressing the complaints, or never 
addressing the complaints at all.278 
C. Policy Considerations 
As a result of the Tiffany decision, trademark owners carry the 
burden of policing e-commerce marketplaces, and searching for 
counterfeits.279 Aside from the duty to address specific instances of 
counterfeiting addressed by brand owners, “the Second Circuit 
imposed no duty on eBay to investigate the authenticity of the 
products sold through its website or to take further steps to combat 
the sale of counterfeit products through its forum.”280 This holding 
has created burdensome implications for trademark owners, who 
have since been obligated to pore over multiple e-commerce sites 
on the hunt for counterfeit listings and sellers.281 From a public 
policy standpoint, and in the interest of efficiency, e-commerce 
websites should be required to assess their own marketplaces for 
fraudulent listings and counterfeit sellers. 282  After all, such 
websites possess the knowledge and power to do so by 
“control[ing] access to their marketplaces,” holding the ability to 
“bar counterfeiters, set up filters, review the identity of sellers, and 
otherwise impose conditions for entry.”283  
                                                
 277 See id. 
 278 See id. at 147. 
 279 Michael Pantalony, Contributing to Infringement: Intermediary Liability 
After Tiffany v. Ebay and Louis Vuitton v. Akanoc, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 709, 
712 (2015). 
 280 Id.  
 281 Id. See also Dinwoodie, supra note 119, at 475 (“The [Tiffany] doctrine 
established a rather wooden, binary system. If the intermediary receives specific 
notice and does not act, it might be liable; otherwise, it is not.”). 
 282 Id. 
 283 Id. at 712–13. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Under Tiffany, the standard for contributory liability in the 
United States imposes a burden on the trademark owner, largely 
shaped by eBay’s vigilant anti-counterfeiting measures on its e-
commerce platform. Alibaba’s policies on trademark infringement 
are short, vague, and lenient; slaps on the wrist, at best, to no 
action whatsoever, at worst. It appears likely that Kering will 
prevail under the Tiffany standard for secondary liability against 
the Alibaba defendants due to Alibaba’s specific knowledge of 
counterfeit products sold on their platform and ineffective 
takedown procedures. The preliminary injunction awarded to 
Kering in September 2015 provides an early victory for Kering 
against individual merchant defendants who directly sold 
counterfeits. 
From a public policy standpoint, Kering should prevail because 
brand owners deserve to be afforded more protection for their 
craftsmanship and reputation, both of which can make or break a 
brand. Although brand owners currently bear the burden of 
policing their trademarks for infringement such as counterfeits on 
e-commerce platforms, such marketplaces should have a duty to 
implement effective policies regarding users’ trademark 
infringement on their website. Moreover, e-commerce platforms 
must cooperate with brand owners who report infringing item 
listings by removing such listings in a timely fashion and 
sanctioning users who sell counterfeits and infringe upon 
intellectual property in a manner that is proportional to the 
violation. In doing so, e-commerce platforms act to share the 
burden of policing counterfeiters with brand owners, resulting in a 
partnership to effectively combat trademark infringement. These 
efforts would, in turn, benefit not only the trademark owners, 
whose good will and reputation will remain intact, but also the e-
commerce marketplaces, who can assure customers that their 
website is a safe and legitimate place to do business, and the 
customers, who ultimately gain reassurance that the item they 
purchase on an e-commerce site is what it purports to be.   
 
